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This paper uncovers a new mechanism linking oil wealth to autocratic regime survival: increases
in oil income lower the risk of ouster by groups that establish new autocratic regimes, not
by reducing the likelihood of democratization. We investigate whether oil wealth influences
autocratic survival by lowering the chances of democratization, reducing the risk of transition
to subsequent dictatorship, or both. Using a new measure of autocratic durability shows that
once we model unit effects, oil wealth promotes autocratic survival by lowering their risk of
ouster by rival autocratic groups. Evidence also indicates that oil income increases military
spending in dictatorships, which suggests that increasing oil wealth may deter coups that can
cause regime collapse.
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Data Appendix S: Summary statistics and sample regime collapses
Table S-1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Autocratic Transition 4138 0.024 0.155 0 1
Democratic Transition 4138 0.022 0.148 0 1
Regime duration 4138 19.2 17.3 1 105
Calendar time 4138 33.3 15.2 1 61
Civil War 4138 0.151 0.358 0 1
Neighbor Democracy 4138 0.333 0.600 0 2
Log(GDPpc) 4138 7.50 0.797 6.16 9.72
Log(GDPpc)Dev 4138 -0.0096 0.360 -1.64 1.53
Oilpc 4138 1.97 2.54 0 9.67
OilpcDev 4138 0.0259 1.13 -6.81 5.46
Dict 4138 0.0246 0 .0336 0 0.194












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table S-3: Oil income and all regime failures
Full results from Table 1 (a)
Sample Full Restricted Restricted Full Restricted Full
Include Y i No No No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oilt−1 -0.121** -0.265**
(0.04) (0.10)
Oili -0.092* -0.111** -0.053+ -0.071*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
OilDev -0.196 -0.166 -0.300* -0.290*
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Faili 13.212** 14.901**
(1.15) (1.37)
GDPpci 0.028 0.170 0.015 0.036 -0.064
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09)
GDPpcDev 1.070** 0.895** 1.122** 0.499 0.585
(0.29) (0.31) (0.30) (0.40) (0.39)
GDPpct−1 0.242
(0.37)
Civil wart−1 0.511** 0.778** 0.287 0.502** 0.410* 0.543**
(0.18) (0.25) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Neighbor democracyt−1 0.376** 0.323** 0.364** 0.374** 0.361** 0.367**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Duration time -0.030 0.004 -0.019 -0.029 0.043 0.049+
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Duration time2 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Duration time3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Area under ROC 0.671 0.631 0.672 0.748 0.799
Observations 4138 3176 3176 4138 3176 4138
Countries 114 88 88 114 88 114
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Conditional logit in column 2. Ordinary logit with errors clustered
on country in all other columns. Calendar time polynomials (3) included in all models but not
reported. Years: 1947-2007.
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Table S-4: Oil income and democratic transitoins
Full results from Table 1 (b)
Sample Full Restricted Restricted Full Restricted Full
Include Y i No No No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oilt−1 -0.153** -0.002
(0.05) (0.17)
Oili -0.113+ -0.224** -0.089+ -0.169**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
OilDev 0.032 0.107 -0.055 -0.038
(0.20) (0.16) (0.21) (0.19)
Demi 17.634** 24.107**
(2.16) (3.55)
GDPpci 0.318+ 0.351** 0.396* 0.191+ 0.159
(0.17) (0.12) (0.18) (0.11) (0.14)
GDPpcDev 1.578** 0.939* 1.336** 0.583 0.651
(0.39) (0.44) (0.40) (0.48) (0.49)
GDPpct−1 -0.075
(0.61)
Civil wart−1 0.185 0.199 -0.186 0.236 0.046 0.341
(0.26) (0.41) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23) (0.25)
Neighbor democracyt−1 0.360* 0.367* 0.426** 0.365* 0.456** 0.447**
(0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
Duration time -0.060* -0.054 -0.036 -0.067* 0.014 0.014
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Duration time2 0.001 0.004* 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Duration time3 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Area under ROC 0.721 0.732 0.723 0.804 0.862
Observations 4138 2102 2102 4138 2102 4138
Countries 114 63 63 114 63 114
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Conditional logit in column 2. Ordinary logit with errors clustered
on country in all other columns. Calendar time polynomials (3) included in all models but not
reported. Years: 1947-2007.
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Table S-5: Oil income and autocratic transitions
Full results from Table 1 (c)
Sample Full Restricted Restricted Full Restricted Full
Include Y i No No No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oilt−1 -0.055 -0.325*
(0.05) (0.13)
Oili -0.097+ -0.014 -0.075+ -0.023
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
OilDev -0.263* -0.280* -0.324* -0.347*
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Dicti 14.344** 19.877**
(1.74) (2.71)
GDPpci -0.262 0.349* -0.335+ 0.172 -0.318+
(0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16)
GDPpcDev 0.480 0.408 0.818+ 0.154 0.384
(0.41) (0.55) (0.49) (0.62) (0.55)
GDPpct−1 0.249
(0.57)
Civil wart−1 0.692** 0.943** 0.431+ 0.643* 0.501* 0.701**
(0.26) (0.33) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.25)
Neighbor democracyt−1 0.433** 0.333+ 0.355* 0.425** 0.300+ 0.313+
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Duration time -0.003 0.061 0.013 0.003 0.065 0.083*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Duration time2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Duration time3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Area under ROC 0.710 0.662 0.724 0.735 0.828
Observations 4138 2202 2202 4138 2202 4138
Countries 114 57 57 114 57 114
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Conditional logit in column 2. Ordinary logit with errors clustered
on country in all other columns. Calendar time polynomials (3) included in all models but not
reported. Years: 1947-2007.
6
Appendix A: Robustness tests
The top panel of Table A-1 shows the variance of the mean levels and deviations of oil wealth, by
geographic region. Oil income has the most variation in the Middle East and North Africa – both
across and within countries. This is also the region where dictatorships tend to be the most stable
during the sample period, suggesting that statistical approaches (such as a conditional logit) that
drop countries that do not experience transitions exclude many cases from the region with the most
variation in oil income.
The bottom panels report results from the specification in column 6 from Table 1 when we add
a binary variable for the ‘excluded’ region and interactions between this excluded region and Oil
and between region and OilDev. The coefficient estimates for Oil and OilDev estimate the marginal
effect of these variables for all regions except for the ‘excluded’ region. We report the Wald test for
the interaction terms, which estimates whether these interaction terms are jointly significant. A
statistically signification Wald test provided some evidence that the oil estimates are substantively
different in the excluded region.
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Table A-1: Robustness to excluding geographic regions
(a) Sample variance, by region
Region
MENA LA Asia SSA EU
Variance OilDev 3.72 0.71 0.81 0.82 0.93
Variance Oili 8.13 3.91 2.97 3.48 3.25
(b) Democratic transitions
Excluded region
All regions included MENA LA Asia SSA EU
Oil -0.169** -0.141* -0.204* -0.187** -0.154* -0.161*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
OilDev -0.038 0.127 -0.044 -0.151 -0.076 -0.074
(0.19) (0.19) (0.26) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Wald test (χ2) 0.3 2.9 0.7 1.7 0.9
(c) Autocratic transitions
Excluded region
All regions included MENA LA Asia SSA EU
Oil 0.039 -0.091 0.001 -0.030 -0.016 -0.036
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
OilDev -0.347* -0.294+ -0.303+ -0.402* -0.344* -0.343*
(0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14)
Wald test (χ2) 0.6 2.1 0.9 1.2 9.1*
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Logit with errors clustered on country. Control variables, time
dependence polynomials (3), and calendar time polynomials (3) included in all models but not
reported. Years: 1947-2007. Wald tests are for the interaction between the region dummy and
oil variables in the full sample.
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Table A-2: Oil income and autocratic survival
(Ross 2008 Oil & Gas rents)
(a) Democratic transitions
Sample Full Restricted Restricted Full Restricted Full
Include Y i No No No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oilt−1 -0.183** -0.012
(0.06) (0.21)
Oili -0.130* -0.114+ -0.227** -0.206**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
OilDev -0.044 0.015 0.040 0.056
(0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16)
Demi 18.889** 28.766**
(2.15) (2.97)
Log likelihood -351.1 -169.1 -279.6 -263.8 -349.9 -298.8
Observations 3593 1654 1654 1654 3593 3593
(b) Autocratic transitions
Sample Full Restricted Restricted Full Restricted Full
Include Y i No No No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oilt−1 -0.088 -0.447**
(0.06) (0.15)
Oili -0.111+ -0.084 -0.039 -0.046
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
OilDev -0.330** -0.414** -0.371** -0.451**
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Dicti 15.676** 21.787**
(1.93) (2.79)
Log likelihood -377.6 -234.2 -322.1 -306.8 -374.6 -337.3
Observations 3593 1756 1756 1756 3593 3593
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Conditional logit in column 2. Ordinary logit with
errors clustered on country in all other columns. Time dependence polynomials (3); cal-
endar time polynomials (3); and control variables (GDP per capita, Civil War, Neighbor
Democracy) included in all models but not reported. Years: 1961-2007.
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Table A-3: Fuel income and autocratic survival
(Haber & Menaldo 2011 Fuel Income)
(a) Democratic transitions
Sample Full Restricted Restricted Full Restricted Full
Include Y i No No No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuelt−1 -0.144** -0.105
(0.06) (0.18)
Fueli -0.116+ -0.089+ -0.202** -0.163**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
FuelDev 0.009 -0.071 0.075 -0.048
(0.18) (0.20) (0.14) (0.17)
Demi 17.684** 24.211**
(2.06) (3.34)
Log likelihood -414.8 -235.0 -344.7 -322.0 -413.0 -357.2
Observations 4138 2102 2102 2102 4138 4138
(b) Autocratic transitions
Sample Full Restricted Restricted Full Restricted Full
Include Y i No No No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuelt−1 -0.161* -0.282*
(0.07) (0.13)
Fueli -0.097+ -0.069+ -0.128* -0.097
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
FuelDev -0.246+ -0.300* -0.314* -0.348*
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16)
Dicti 14.220** 19.592**
(1.77) (2.61)
Log likelihood -449.4 -300.7 -397.9 -381.2 -448.2 -408.2
Observations 4138 2202 2202 2202 4138 4138
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Conditional logit in column 2. Ordinary logit with
errors clustered on country in all other columns. Time dependence polynomials (3); cal-
endar time polynomials (3); and control variables (GDP per capita, Civil War, Neighbor
Democracy) included in all models but not reported. Years: 1947-2007.
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Table A-4: Regression of country means
Oil variable H&M H&M Ross Ross
Transition Dem Autocratic Dem Autocratic
Oili -0.331+ 0.077 -0.310+ -0.003
(0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)
R2 0.246 0.257 0.233 0.256
Observations 113 114 110 110
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Dependent variable is
FailTypei. OLS; standard errors in parentheses. One ob-
servation per country. All models control for mean level
of Log(GDPpct−1), CivilWart−1, NeighborDemocracy,
T imeDuration and TimeDuration2. Model in first column
excludes Costa Rica as an outlier; including it more than
doubles the size of the coefficient. Coefficient estimate in
first column indicates that a 2 standard deviation increase
in mean oil level is associated with a 1.7% decrease in mean
democracy. Coefficient in third column indicates a similar
1.5% decrease in mean democracy.
11
Table A-5: Linear probability model
(with country and year FE)
Oil variable H&M H&M Ross Ross
Transition Dem Autocratic Dem Autocratic
Oilt−1 -0.132 -0.723** 0.027 -0.859**
(0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29)
R2 0.039 0.035 0.041 0.033
Observations 4138 4138 3593 3593
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Dependent variable
is Regime Transition (Democratic, Autocratic). OLS
with country and year fixed effects; standard errors in
parentheses. All models control for: Log(GDPpct−1),
CivilWart−1, NeighborDemocracy, T imeDuration. Co-
efficient estimate in second column indicates that a 2 stan-
dard deviation increase in oil is associated with a 4.0%
decrease in the linear probability of autocratic transition.
Coefficient in fourth column indicates a similar 4.8% de-
crease in linear probability of autocratic transition.
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Table A-6: Oil income and democratic transition
(with ACLP/CGV data)
Calendar time Trend Trend Year FE Year FE
Oili -0.188** -0.112 -0.196** -0.124+
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
OilDev 0.095 -0.022 0.144 0.043
(0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.19)
Demi 32.485** 33.914**
(4.77) (5.02)
Log likelihood -401.1 -332.5 -362.0 -294.3
Observations 4368 4368 3273 3273
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Dependent variable is Demo-
cratic Transition. Ordinary logit with standard errors clus-
tered on country. All models control for: Log(GDPpct−1),
CivilWart−1, NeighborDemocracy, T imeDuration, and
T imeDuration2. Estimates for Oili are much larger and sta-
tistically significant at the 0.05 level when we include mean
and deviation of log(Population) (not reported).
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Table A-7: Modeling time and oil price
Year FE Y Y N N
Year polynomials N N Y Y
Oil price control N N Y Y
Transition Democratic Autocratic Democratic Autocratic
Oili -0.189** -0.023 -0.181** -0.023
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
OilDev 0.066 -0.368* 0.006 -0.347*





Log likelihood -308.4 -372.0 -355.3 -408.9
Observations 3175 3316 4138 4138
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Dependent variable is Regime Transition
(Democratic, Autocratic). Ordinary logit with clustered standard errors
in parentheses. All models control for: Log(GDPpct−1), CivilWart−1,
NeighborDemocracy, T imeDuration.
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Table A-8: Time period results
(pre-1980 & post-1979)
Transition Democratic Autocratic
Oil interactions with pre-1980 dummy N Y N Y
Oili -0.189** -0.241** -0.023 -0.073
(0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09)
OilDev 0.066 0.164 -0.368* -0.465*
(0.23) (0.23) (0.15) (0.23)
Oili × pre80 0.125 0.084
(0.13) (0.13)
OilDev × pre80 -0.263 0.150
(0.35) (0.23)
Coefficients for the pre-1980 period
βOil + βOil×pre80 -0.116 0.012
(0.11) (0.07)
βOilDev + βOilDev×pre80 -0.099 -0.315*
(0.32) (0.17)
Log likelihood -308.4 -307.8 -372.0 -371.6
Observations 3175 3175 3316 3316
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Dependent variable is Regime Transition (Demo-
cratic, Autocratic). Ordinary logit with clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses. All models control for: Log(GDPpct−1), CivilWart−1, NeighborDemocracy,
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Figure A-1: Non-proportional hazard for Oil Deviations, Autocratic transitions model.
This graph shows how the coefficient for OilDev varies by duration time in the model reported in
Table 1, Panel C, column 6 (with year fixed effects). The Wald-test for the (3) interactions between
duration time polynomials (3) and OilDev, however, yields a test statistic with p = 0.28, suggesting
that these coefficients are not jointly statistically different from zero. A test of non-proportional
hazards in a Cox model (stratified by country) also indicates that the proportional hazard assump-
tion is not violated. Nonetheless, there appears to be a substantive pattern suggesting that the
within-country effect is concentrated in the first decade the autocratic regime holds power. Similar
Wald-tests and tests for non-proportional hazards in Cox models for models reported in column (6)
of Panels A and B in Table 1 yield test statistics with p > 0.65, suggesting that the proportional
hazards assumption is not violated.
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Andersen and Ross (2014) argue that the effect of oil occurs over periods greater than a year
because many oil-rich countries have sovereign wealth funds or other mechanisms for smoothing
short-term fluctuations in oil income. To investigate this, we use longer lagged moving averages
of oil income to calculate the deviation variable. The main result for within-country changes in
oil wealth remains, though it becomes slightly weaker as the moving average increases over more
lagged years. Figure A-2 shows the coefficient estimates for oil deviations, using the lagged moving
average for oil income instead of the one-year lagged deviation.
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Figure A-2: Coefficients for oil deviations, calculated using lagged moving averages
for oil income. This graph reports the results for the OilDev coefficient for the main model
specification (column 6 in Table 1) when the model includes year fixed effects. The value of 1 on the
horizontal axis of these figures corresponds with the coefficient estimate for OilDev ≡ Oilt−d,i−Oili
where d = 1. We then calculate the deviations using the lagged moving average of oil income over
the previous d periods instead of just the one-year lag. The coefficients and confidence intervals for
OilDev are shown as d increases from 1 to 8.
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Figure A-3: Separation plots. The vertical axes and the dashed lines show the predicted risk
of transition (models reported in column 6 of Table 1, panels B and C). The horizontal axes
order the observations from the lowest to the highest predicted risk for 4138 observations. The
vertical blue shading marks observations where the dependent variable is equal to one, or observed
transitions. These plots show that the democratic transition model appears to perform better than
the autocratic transition model.
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Appendix B: Extension of conditional logit in Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Table B-1 explores why the null result for time-varying oil income and democracy in the conditional
logit model (column 2, Panel B, Table 1 in the main text) differs from the positive result reported
in the Appendix to Haber and Menaldo (2011). Our baseline specification is different from the HM
model in a couple of ways: we examine a shorter time period (post-1946); we control for regime du-
ration; we substitute calendar year polynomials for year fixed effects; we log the oil income variable;
and we examine a sample of autocracies (only) to assess the likelihood of democratic transition.
This latter difference means that we are using only one-half of a typical Markov switching model,
which in this literature simultaneously estimates the risk of transition to and from democracy.
The first column replicates the conditional logit result from the Appendix to Haber and Menaldo
(2011). This specification is a simple logit that includes year fixed effects for every year from 1970
onwards as well as country fixed effects (thus technically an unconditional logit).1 The second
column includes interactions between the year fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable,
allowing the time effects to vary by whether the incumbent regime is a dictatorship or a democracy.
The positive result for oil remains. The third column interacts the country fixed effects with lagged
regime, allowing the country effects to vary by type of transition. The oil coefficient is now much
smaller and no longer significant at the 0.10 level. The fourth column includes interactions between
lagged regime and both year and country effects. The fifth column replicates this result by using
only one-half of a full Markov switching model in that it only examines autocratic observations that
are at risk of democratizing. The main result for oil income is again smaller and not statistically
different from zero. This suggests that one reason our result is different is that our estimate for
oil income is conditioned on a country effect that aggregates information only over autocratic
observations and not over both autocratic and democratic observations.
The sixth column substitutes calendar year polynomials for year fixed effects; the result for
oil income is similar to that in column 1. The seventh column uses the natural log of oil income
instead of the raw per capita value. The oil income coefficient is no longer significant (because oil
income has been transformed, the size of the coefficient in column 5 is not comparable to that in
other columns). In the eighth column, we control for regime duration time with three polynomials
(and interact them with lagged regime). The coefficient for oil income is positive, suggesting that
modeling regime duration does not substantively alter the estimate of the oil coefficient. In the
ninth column, we restrict the sample to the post-WWII period, and this yields similar results to
column 1.
Finally, in the last column we implement all of these changes to the specification at once: we
log oil income, use only the autocratic half of the Markov switching model, substitute calendar year
polynomials for year fixed effects, restrict the sample to post-1946, and control for regime duration.
This specification is most similar to the empirical approach we use throughout the paper. The oil
income coefficient is now negative but not statistically different from zero.
The results in this table suggest two changes we make to the model specification that are most
likely to account for why the null finding in our model of the relationship between oil income
and democratic transition (column 2, Panel B, Table 1 in the main text) differs from the positive
finding in Haber and Menaldo’s. First, we use the natural log of oil income which, as column
7 suggests, diminishes the positive influence of oil income on the risk of democratic transition.
1At T>20, the coefficient estimates for the conditional logit and the unconditional logit with
unit FE’s converge (see Katz 2001). The coefficient for the conditional logit is: 1.333 (0.65).
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Second, we employ one-half of a full Markov transition model and thus analyze only autocratic
observations. This means we estimate cross-country unit effects only for autocratic time periods,
which is equivalent to interacting the country fixed effects with the lagged dependent variable
(measuring prior state) in a full Markov transition model.
Sample restriction in conditional logit: Oil and regime transition example
The conditional logit model makes two changes to an ordinary logit: it restricts the sample to
countries that transition to or from democracy during the sample period, excluding countries that
never change states; and it accounts for unit specific effects. Table B-2 explores the relative influence
of these changes by first showing how a simple logit performs using the full (column 1) and restricted
samples (column 2). The third column introduces unit effects by employing a conditional logit.
This is the same model reported in the Appendix to Haber and Menaldo (2011) and shown in
column 1 of Table B-2. The difference between the odds ratios in the first two columns is the result
of excluding the cases that never change. The difference between the estimates in the second and
third columns results from accounting for unit effects.
First, note that the number of countries drops from 165 to 80 when the sample is restricted
to include only those that change states. This change to the model moves the odds ratio from a
negative and significant estimate to a positive (though statistically insignificant) estimate. Adding
unit effects in the third column makes the odds ratio more positive and statistically significant.
We are reluctant to interpret these results substantively without estimating both the cross-
country and within-country variation, but provide them as a caution to users of conditional logit
models. For models of oil and democratic transitions, the potential bias from restricting the sample
(reflected in the difference in odds ratios in columns 1 and 2 of Table B-2) shows up in the results
reported in Table 1 of the main text as bias in the estimates of the cross-country correlations (Oili).
Comparing the βOili ’s in models in columns 5 and 6 in Panel B in Table 1 (main text) shows that
restricting the sample biases the estimate in a positive direction (towards zero in this case). This
should not be surprising because many of the countries that do not democratize during the sample
period have high oil incomes.
Table B-3 reports the results for a similar exercise using the democratic and autocratic transition
dependent variables employed in Tables 1 and 2 of the main text. For both types of transition,
restricting the sample in the ordinary logit moves the estimate for Oilt−1 closer to the estimate from
the conditional logit. Again, we caution against interpreting these estimates substantively because





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B-2: Potential bias from sample restriction
Logit Simple Simple Conditional
Sample Full Restricted Restricted
Oil incomet−1 -1.02 0.25 1.33
(0.026) (0.635) (0.039)
Countries 165 80 80
Observations 9305 5932 5932
Replication and extension of conditional logit models in
the Appendix to Haber and Menaldo (2011). Reported
odds ratio for transition from Autocracy to Democ-
racy. P-values in parentheses. Model specification is
the same as in column 1 of Table B-1.
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Table B-3: Potential bias in the conditional logit
(a) Democratic transitions
Logit Simple Simple Conditional
Sample Full Restricted Restricted
Oil incomet−1 -0.169 -0.095 -0.002
(0.00) (0.12) (0.99)
Countries 114 63 63
Observations 4138 2120 2120
(b) Autocratic transitions
Logit Simple Simple Conditional
Sample Full Restricted Restricted
Oil incomet−1 -0.056 -0.131 -0.325
(0.33) (0.01) (0.01)
Countries 114 57 57
Observations 4138 2202 2202
Extension of analysis reported in Table 1. Odds ra-
tios reported; p-values in parentheses. Model only
examines countries coded as autocracy on January 1
of the observation year. Control variables include:
Log(GDPpc)t−1, CivilWart−1, Neighbor Democracy,
Calendar year trend (3), and duration polynomials (3).
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Appendix C: Oil Wealth and Polity Durable variable
Haber and Menaldo (2011) examine how oil wealth influences democracy using two measures of
the latter concept: the combined Polity scale (treated as a quasi-continuous variable); and a binary
indicator of transition from non-democracy to democracy from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland
(2010). They show that the negative statistical correlation between oil and these measures largely
disappears once they account for unit fixed effects. They find no evidence that time-varying oil
wealth is negatively correlated with the level of democracy, changes in the level of democracy, or the
risk of democratic transition. In this Appendix, we examine another widely used measure of ‘regime
instability’, the Polity Durable variable, which is a binary indicator of whether the combined Polity
score has changed three or more points (in either direction) over the past three years.
We begin by taking all the Polity Durable failures where we have non-missing data on oil wealth
and the combined Polity scale on December 31 of the prior calendar year is less than six, indicating
that Polity codes the observation year as not-Democracy. To test the relationship between oil
wealth and the risk of a Polity Durable failure, we use a logit model with a similar specification
to that used throughout.2 The first column of Table C-1 reports this result and shows that lagged
oil wealth is negatively correlated with the risk of Durable failure – the now standard finding
reflected in the bulk of the research on the oil curse. The next column separates the cross-sectional
and time-varying oil wealth information using two separate variables (see main text). This result
indicates that the mean value of oil wealth is negatively correlated with Durable failure but that
time-varying oil wealth, while negative, does not have a strong statistical association with this
measure of political change.
Next we separate the ‘democratic’ Polity Durable failures from the ‘non-democratic’ failures.
The former category includes only those Durable failures where the combined Polity score is 6
or more on December 31 of the observation year, indicating that the Durable failure as also a
‘democratic transition’ – as defined by Polity. The models in columns 3 and 4 report the results
for tests of the democratic Polity Durable failures. There is a strong negative correlation between
oil wealth and the risk of these failures, but it appears to only be a cross-sectional correlation,
consistent with our findings in the text and the main findings in Haber and Menaldo (2011).
In the final two columns of the top panel of C-1, we examine non-democratic Durable failures
– all those not marked as ‘democratic’. These include events such as the legalization of opposition
parties in the former Zaire (1992) and the Iranian Revolution (1979) as well as shifts in the Iranian
Presidency between the moderate and conservative factions of the theocratic regime in 1997 and
2005. As these examples illustrates, these failures include events where: (1) the incumbent regime
loses power and (2) events when the incumbent regime remains in power. The results indicate a
negative correlation between oil wealth and the risk of non-democratic Durable failures. However,
the result in column 6 suggests that this correlation is again mostly cross-sectional.
The bottom panel of C-1 reports the results from identical tests using the GWF measure
of autocratic regime collapse (all failures, autocracy-to-democracy transitions, and autocracy-to-
autocracy transitions). The results for All Failures and Democratic Transitions in columns 7-10
are nearly identical to the results from similar tests using the Polity Durable variable. We do not
find this surprising because – particularly in the case of democratic transitions – both data sources
are coding similar events. However, the results using the GWF data differ from those using the
2Control variables include: a calendar time trend; duration polynomials; Log GDP per capita;
Civil war; and Neighbor democratization, and a constant.
24
Polity Durable data for non-democratic transitions. Tests using the GWF data indicate a strong
negative correlation between time-varying oil wealth and autocracy-to-autocracy transitions while
the Polity Durable tests show that the correlation between oil wealth and non-democratic Durable
failures is largely cross-sectional. In short, we get similar answers using the two data sets when
asking questions about democratic transitions but very different answers when asking about other
types of political change in autocracies.
To help readers better understand why the results differ for non-democratic Polity Durable
failures and GWF autocracy-to-autocracy transitions, Table C-2 lists 57 autocracy-to-autocracy
regime collapses that are not captured by the Durable failure variable. This is a conservative list
of regime collapses because we only include cases where no Durable failure is observed in years t-1,
t, or t+1. Thus it is impossible to capture these autocratic regime collapse events with the Polity
data.
Finally, Table C-3 lists the 79 observations of Durable failure when there is no autocratic regime
collapse, as measured by GWF. In all of these cases, Polity Durable codes a ‘regime failure’ even
though the incumbent autocratic regime – as we define it – remains in power. In 59 of these 79
cases, the incumbent leader remains in power. Again this is a conservative list because we only
include those Durable failures where no regime collapse occurred in years t-1, t, or t+1.
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Table C-1: Comparing Polity Durable Failure and GWF Autocratic Regime Collapse
(a) Polity Durable Failure
All Failures Dem Failures Non-Dem Failures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oilt−1 -0.320** -0.539* -0.263*
(0.11) (0.22) (0.11)
Oili -0.280** -0.528* -0.223*
(0.10) (0.22) (0.11)
OilDev -0.135 -0.056 -0.132
(0.10) (0.22) (0.10)
(b) GWF Autocratic Regime Failure
All Failures Dem Failures Non-Dem Failures
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Oilt−1 -0.351** -0.474** -0.156
(0.11) (0.15) (0.16)
Oili -0.283** -0.571** -0.035
(0.10) (0.18) (0.14)
OilDev -0.187 0.121 -0.317*
(0.14) (0.18) (0.16)
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Dependent variable in top panel is Polity
Durable Failure; Democratic Failures are those where the combined Polity score
crosses the +6 threshold for ‘democratic’ transition; Non-Democratic Failures
are all other Polity Durable Failures. GWF autocratic regime failures are
described in the text and listed earlier in the Appendix. Reported coefficient
estimates are multiplied by the in-sample standard deviation of the respective
variable. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. 4179 observations
in 118 countries in the top panel; 4138 observations in 114 countries in the
bottom panel.
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Table C-2: Autocratic Regime Collapse but No Durable Failure
Country Year Country Year
Afghanistan 1973 Iraq 1958
Argentina 1958 Iraq 1963
Bangladesh 1975 Iraq 1968
Benin 1965 Iraq 1979
Benin 1967 Laos 1960
Bolivia 1964 Laos 1962
Burkina Faso 1966 Lesotho 1986
Burkina Faso 1982 Liberia 1980
Burkina Faso 1987 Libya 1969
Burundi 1966 Madagascar 1975
Burundi 1987 Mali 1968
Cameroon 1983 Mauritania 1978
Cen African Rep 1965 Myanmar 1988
Cen African Rep 1979 Nepal 1951
Cen African Rep 1981 Niger 1974
Chad 1975 Nigeria 1993
Colombia 1953 Pakistan 1977
Congo-Brz 1968 Panama 1982
Congo/Zaire 1997 Rwanda 1973
Ecuador 1972 Sierra Leone 1968
El Salvador 1982 Sierra Leone 1992
Gambia 1994 Syria 1951
Ghana 1966 Syria 1958
Guatemala 1958 Thailand 1947
Guatemala 1963 Uganda 1971
Guatemala 1970 Yemen 1974
Guinea 1984 Yemen 1978
Guinea Bissau 1980 Yugoslavia 1990
Haiti 1988
Autocratic regime collapse observations when:
(1) there is no Durable failure in years t-1, t, or
t+1; (2) the autocratic regime collapse did not
end in a transition to democracy; and (3) there
is non-missing data on the oil wealth variable. 57
observations of regime collapse that end in either
transition to a subsequent dictatorship or an oc-
cupied regime (Laos 1962).
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Table C-3: Durable Failures but No Autocratic Regime Collapse
Leader Leader Leader
Country Year Exit Country Year Exit Country Year Exit
Algeria 1989 0 Indonesia 1957 0 Paraguay 1989 1
Algeria 1995 0 Iran 1953 1 Peru 1950 1
Algeria 2004 0 Iran 1997 1 Peru 1978 0
Angola 1991 0 Iran 2004 0 Philippines 1981 0
Bangladesh 1978 0 Ivory Coast 2002 0 Senegal 1962 0
Brazil 1974 1 Jordan 1951 1 Senegal 1978 0
Burkina Faso 1969 0 Jordan 1957 0 Sierra Leone 1971 0
Burkina Faso 1977 0 Jordan 1989 0 Sudan 2002 0
Burkina Faso 2001 0 Kenya 1969 0 Swaziland 1973 0
Cambodia 1997 1 Kenya 1997 0 Taiwan 1987 0
Cameroon 1992 0 Korea South 1963 0 Tajikistan 1997 0
Central African Republic 1991 0 Korea South 1972 0 Tanzania 1995 1
Congo Kinshasa 1992 0 Korea South 1981 0 Thailand 1952 0
Czechoslovakia 1968 1 Kuwait 1990 1 Thailand 1955 0
Egypt 2005 0 Madagascar 1991 0 Thailand 1968 0
El Salvador 1964 0 Mauritania 1962 0 Thailand 1971 0
El Salvador 1977 1 Mexico 1977 0 Togo 1991 0
El Salvador 1979 1 Mexico 1988 1 Tunisia 1987 1
Gabon 1990 0 Mexico 1994 1 Uganda 1993 0
Gambia 1996 0 Mongolia 1990 1 Uganda 2005 0
Ghana 1991 0 Morocco 1961 1 Yugoslavia 1951 0
Ghana 1996 0 Morocco 1965 0 Zambia 1972 0
Guatemala 1974 1 Nepal 1957 0 Zambia 2001 0
Guinea 1995 0 Nepal 1981 0 Zimbabwe 1983 0
Guinea-Bissau 1994 0 Nicaragua 1984 0 Zimbabwe 1987 0
Hungary 1956 1 Pakistan 1985 0 Zimbabwe 1999 0
Hungary 1988 1
Durable failure observations when: (1) there is no regime collapse in years t-1, t, or t+1; (2) the Durable
failure did not mark an increase in the Polity score such that it passed the Democratization threshold of +6;
and (3) there is non-missing data on the oil wealth variable. In all 79 cases, the incumbent autocratic regime
remains in power and in 59 cases the incumbent leader remains in power.
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Appendix D: Endogenous oil income
In this Appendix we report the results of the two-stage models that use logged Oil reserves per
capita (5-year lag) as an excluded instrument for logged Oil income per capita (1-year lag). Figures
D-1 to D-5 depict the de-meaned level of logged oil income per capita (1-year lag) and the de-means
value of logged oil reserves per capita (5-year lag) over time for dictatorships in five countries in
different regions of the world: Angola, China, Egypt, Malaysia, and Mexico. These graphs illustrate
that while oil reserves are highly correlated with income, many of the year-to-year fluctuations in
oil income that may reflect political expectations do not correspond to known reserves.
For example, in Angola reserves were stagnant after 2000 but oil income increased steadily after
the death of the long-time rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, in 2002 (and the increase in international
oil prices the following year).3 Expectations about increased political stability after Savimbi’s
death may have contributed to both the steady increase in oil income and regime longevity. In
this case, while the oil reserves are clearly correlated with oil income, the former does not pick up
the potentially endogenous changes in oil income associated with the expectations about political
stability stemming from this decisive political event. In China, we see a similar pattern post-
1999: while oil income increased, reserves were stagnant. Indeed for much of the economic reform
period (early 1980s onwards), reserves are relatively stagnant but income bounces up and down.
In Egypt, both in the early 1980s (after Sadat’s assassination) and then again after 2000 (once
the younger cohort of the NDP, led by Gamal Mubarak, took over many leadership positions in
the party), lagged reserves and oil income run in the opposite direction. In Malaysia, oil income
dips during the 1998 Asian financial crisis but then rebounds quickly and increases throughout the
2000s. Lagged reserves, however, are relatively stagnant during this period of political turmoil for
the ruling BN coalition. Finally in Mexico the large decline in oil income during the period of
economic stagnation in the 1980s (particularly around the crucial 1988 election, prior to which the
PRI split) coincides with an increase in lagged resources. Further the potentially decisive decline in
oil income over the 15-year period from the mid-1980s to 2000 coincides with a period of stagnant
lagged reserves. In the latter four countries, lagged oil reserves appear to reflect the large increases
in oil income associated with the 1970s oil boom. These examples are only illustrative, but we
believe they nonetheless demonstrate, across a range of cases, that oil income changes linked to
decisive political events are not generally reflected in the lagged measure of oil reserves.
Table D-1 reports results from the first stage equations. In each model the excluded instrument,
ReservesDev, is strongly correlated with OilDev. F-tests indicate that this excluded instrument is
statistically different from zero in the first stage. One standard cut-point for these F-tests is 10;
the F-statistics from these models exceed this threshold (> 220 in each case).
Table D-2 reports the second stage results. For each IV result, we first report a naive result for
the same model specification on the same sample. The first four columns report results from probit
models; the latter four from linear probability models (LPMs). Comparing results from columns
(1) and (2) for the transitions to democracy equation, we see that the IV estimate is much larger
than the naive result, both of which are positive. This suggests the naive result under-estimates
3Both rising world oil prices and Savimbi’s death contributed to the rapid increase in Angolan
oil income after 2002. Using the Angolan time series for oil income (log) and the world oil price in
a linear model, we find that a post-2002 dummy variable (a proxy for Savimbi’s death) accounts
for roughly a 32% increase in oil income from 2003-2006, while the increase in the oil price ($32)
accounts for a 47% increase in Angolan oil income after 2002.
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the positive correlation between increases in oil income and the likelihood of democratic transition.
Comparing results from columns (3) and (4) for transitions to new autocracy, we find that the
coefficient estimates of interest are similar: 0.153 and 0.130, respectively. This suggests that the
naive estimates may over-estimate the negative correlation between oil and risk of transition to
new autocracy, but only slightly. The results in columns (7) and (8) largely mirror these. Though
the IV estimate in column (8) is not statistically significant at the 0.10 level and is slightly smaller
(-0.716) than the naive estimate (-0.921), it is roughly the same size as the estimate reported in
column (2) of Table A-5 (-0.723). For readers concerned with statistical significance, we note that
the p-value for the estimate of oil income in (4) is 0.111 and in (8) it is 0.137.
Figure D-6 shows the partial correlation between oil reserves and oil income in the first stage.
Two countries – Libya (620) and Chad (483) – stand out as potential outliers in the first stage
equation. Dropping one or both of these countries from the analysis strengthens the main finding
reported in column (4) of Table D-2: the estimate of interest is greater than 0.16 and statistically
significant at conventional levels (results reported in the replication files).
Results reported in the replication files also indicate that when we estimate the model in column
(8) but treat both the mean level of oil income and the deviation of oil income as endogenous – by
including a second excluded instrument, Resourcesi – the estimate of interest is almost identical
to that reported in column (8). Finally, when we estimate (8) but split the sample by time period
(pre-1980 and post-1979) we find similar results: the estimate of interest is -0.78 in the early period
and -0.90 and statistically significant at conventional levels in the latter.
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Civil war -0.009 -0.013
(0.05) (0.05)











+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. De-
pendent variable is OilDev . Excluded
instrument is: ReservesDev . Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered on
regime. All models control for duration
time (cubic polynomial) and a calendar
time trend (cubic polynomial); these
are not reported. 3704 observations
from 250 distinct autocratic regimes in
114 countries from 1947-2007.
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Table D-2: Second-stage IV results
Probit (1-4) Linear probability (5-8)
Transition Democracy Autocracy Democracy Autocracy
Naive IV Naive IV Naive IV Naive IV
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OilDev 0.037 0.138 -0.153* -0.130 -0.087 0.015 -0.921** -0.716
(0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.30) (0.34) (0.34) (0.48)
Oili -0.075* -0.081* -0.004 -0.004 -0.093 -0.095 0.031 0.027
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
GDPpcDev 0.213 0.100 0.230 0.197 0.785 0.645 1.264 0.983
(0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (1.01) (1.05) (0.92) (0.98)
GDPpci 0.057 0.061 -0.189* -0.190* 0.158 0.157 -0.240 -0.247
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.28) (0.28) (0.39) (0.39)
Civil war 0.168 0.176 0.325** 0.325** 0.802 0.813 1.560 1.583+
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.73) (0.73) (0.95) (0.95)
Nbr democracy 0.124+ 0.125+ 0.166* 0.166* 0.675 0.674 0.903+ 0.903+
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.44) (0.44) (0.47) (0.47)
Demi 12.378** 12.240** 104.707** 104.570**
(1.38) (1.41) (9.78) (9.72)
Dicti 10.429** 10.365** 104.399** 103.993**
(1.69) (1.70) (19.03) (18.99)
(Intercept) -2.942** -2.941** -0.912 -0.904 -1.540 -1.518 1.775 1.854
(0.71) (0.71) (0.76) (0.76) (2.57) (2.58) (4.20) (4.20)
+ p<0.10;∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on regime. Dependent variable is Regime
Transition (Democratic, Autocratic). Binary dependent variable multiplied by 100 in LPMs for ease of interpretation.
All models control for duration time (cubic polynomial) and a calendar time trend (cubic polynomial); these are not


























Figure D-1: Oil reserves (5-year lag) and oil income (1-year lag) in Angola. Both























Figure D-2: Oil reserves (5-year lag) and oil income (1-year lag) in China. Both measures























Figure D-3: Oil reserves (5-year lag) and oil income (1-year lag) in Egypt. Both measures























Figure D-4: Oil reserves (5-year lag) and oil income (1-year lag) in Malaysia. Both























Figure D-5: Oil reserves (5-year lag) and oil income (1-year lag) in Mexico. Both
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e( dev_l5reserves | X )
coef = .68995707, (robust) se = .04631742, t = 14.9
Figure D-6: First-stage partial correlation, Oil reserves and Oil income. Bivariate plot
from model (2) in Table D-1. Observations labeled by country-code. Libya (620) and Chad (483).
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Appendix E: Military spending
Table E-1 reports the summary statistics for Table 2 in the main text. Figure E-1 shows the distri-
bution of military spending in the main sample used in Table 2 of the main text (3288 observations).
Military spending data is the logged value of constant dollars. Instead of using population size in
the denominator of the dependent variable, we control for population size in all regressions. Unit
fixed effects condition estimates on country size.
In results reported in the replication files, we test the robustness of the model in Table 2,
column (2). First, we trim the data to exclude all observations with extreme values for differences
in oil income (absolute value >2). Second, we exclude all observations with dfbeta values greater
than the 2/sqrt(N) cut-point. Third, we run the model with robust regression which down-weights
potential outliers. Fourth, we control for military personnel size, with data from the Correlates of
War project. These changes all yield similar substantive results, with all estimated coefficients for
the differenced variables statistically different from zero at conventional levels. Finally, we compare
the coefficients for the LRM using the COW data and military spending data from SIPRI. The
SIPRI sample, however, contains less than 1000 observations, which is less than a third of the size
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Figure E-1: Military spending in autocratic regimes. Logged constant dollar values.
Finally, the graphs in Figure E-2 show the cross-sectional relationship between oil income and
military spending in dictatorships. To generate these graphs, we calculated the mean level of
oil income (log units) and the mean level of military spending (log units, constant dollars) for
each autocratic regime in the sample. Some countries, such as Argentina and Iran, have more
than one regime in the sample. Others, such as China and Mexico, have only one autocratic
regime during the post-1946 period. The left panel shows the bivariate relationship between the
two mean level variables, while the right panel shows the partial regression plot of the bivariate
relationship conditional on the (regime-mean) level of GDP per capita (log), population size (log),
and international war. In both graphs, there is a strong cross-sectional correlation between oil
income and military spending.
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Figure E-2: Oil income and military spending in autocratic regimes. Data points reflect
the mean levels of oil income (log) and military spending (log) by autocratic regime. Analysis of
230 distinct autocratic regimes from 1947-2007.
40
Table E-1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Military spending 3288 12.72 2.09 7.15 19.85
Oil income 3288 2.19 2.93 0 11.11
Population size 3288 9.18 1.37 5.88 14.09
International war 3288 0.06 0.23 0 1
Civil war 3288 0.17 .38 0 1
Calendar time 3288 37.2 12.9 15 61
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